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Justification for Conscience Exemptions in Health Care
By Lori Kantymir and Carolyn McLeod ABSTRACT: Some bioethicists argue that conscientious objectors in health care should have to justify themselves, just as objectors in the military do. They should have to provide reasons that explain why they should be exempt from offering the services that they find offensive. There are two versions of this view in the literature, each giving different standards of justification. We show these views are each either too permissive (i.e. would result in problematic exemptions based on conscience) or too restrictive (i.e. would produce problematic denials of exemption). We then develop a middle ground position that we believe better combines respect for the conscience of health care professionals with concern for the duties that they owe to patients. Our claim, in short, is that insofar as objectors should have to justify themselves, they should have to do it according to the standard that we defend rather than according to the standards that others have developed.
In many parts of the world, physicians are free to object conscientiously to providing medical services that are legal and often deemed essential, but that they find morally offensive, such as abortions and contraception. In some jurisdictions, other health care professionals, such as pharmacists, have this 2 freedom as well. The right of these professionals to refuse such services tends to be "unlimited in practice," because no one evaluates the objections that the professionals make.
1 They do not have to explain to anyone why they are objecting. They do not even have to prove that their objection stems from conscience, rather than from some other source (e.g. mere preference).
Some commentators find this state of affairs untenable. They argue that conscientious objectors in health care should have to justify themselves, just as objectors in the military do. They should have to provide reasons that can excuse them from offering services that, according to their profession, they are duty-bound to offer. There are two versions of this view in the literature. One, from Christopher Meyers and Robert Woods, states that objectors in health care
should be required to show that the beliefs on which their objections rest are passionately-held moral or religious beliefs that they must adhere to for the sake of their mental well-being. 2 The other view is from Robert Card: objectors should be required to prove that the beliefs that ground their objections are "reasonable" and "justifiable." 3 To be clear on the difference between these positions: Meyers and Woods demand that objectors reveal what motivates their objection in an effort to prove that it is genuinely conscientious; but, at the same time, they need not demonstrate that what motivates them is justifiable and thus ought to motivate others. Card, by contrast, requires that they do the latter. Call the first view, Proving Genuineness, and the second, Proving
Reasonableness.
We are sympathetic to the general view that conscientious objectors in health care should have to justify themselves (i.e. justify why they, or anyone, should be exempt from performing what is taken to be a professional duty). In the first part of this paper, we discuss why such sympathy is warranted. We then move on to explain that the positions found in the literature on what objectors need to do to justify themselves are problematic. As we demonstrate, Proving
Genuineness is not enough, and Proving Reasonableness is too much. We defend a middle-ground position that we believe better combines respect for the conscience of health care professionals with concern for the duties that they owe to patients.
Why push for some justification?
Some commentators would not push for any requirement that health care professionals justify their conscientious objections. These people might lack sympathy for objectors, believing that they could never be justified in doing what they are doing. For at least two reasons, we reject the claim that conscientious objection in health care is never justified, which would make attempts at justifying objections pointless. First and foremost, this view fails to appreciate that some objections will be morally justified and that the moral integrity of the profession may require that they be made. The example that stands out for us is the refusal by some health care professionals to participate in prenatal sex selection. 7 Second, to be opposed to all conscientious objection in health carewhatever the reason for it and regardless of whether it causes harm-is to fail to take seriously enough the moral gravity of requiring someone to act against sincerely held moral beliefs, especially those that concern life or death, which influence many objections in health care.
But why not just accept the status quo on conscientious objection in medicine-that is, allow objectors to refuse requests for procedures that they find offensive but require that they make a referral? Even if their objections are not justified in any way, patients should still get what they need because of the referrals. This is the second position we described above that opposes justification. In our view, there are four problems with it. One is that some Yet another problem-one that we believe is particularly grave-is that by omitting any requirement that objectors explain their objections, the status quo leaves the door open for discriminatory refusals. Do we really think that racist, sexist, or homophobic health care professionals should be free to refuse care to the people they deem to be morally inferior, just so long as they give referrals? Some would say that it is worse to require them to treat these people, because the "care" they provide will inevitably be substandard. But we think the better response is to deny these professionals the opportunity to care for anyone until they learn the error of their ways. They could undergo mandatory 7 sensitivity training, and if they fail at that, look elsewhere for employment.
One final problem is that referrals are not appropriate when the objection itself is morally justified. An example is an objection to giving a woman an eleventh round of IVF (one involving ovarian stimulation), when the first ten rounds were unsuccessful and there is no reason to think the eleventh round would go any better. Such an objection is arguably justified because, again, there is no reason to think that the intervention would be effective and also because of documented risks to women's health, of ovarian stimulation in particular. 9 In our view, conscientious objections by health care professionals that are morally justified should not be followed up by referrals.
To be clear, our point is not that conscientious objectors should never have to give referrals, but simply that always requiring referrals, and only referrals, is problematic. Someone might object that insisting on some justification from conscientious objectors would be equally problematic. Is it really feasible to have all objectors come before committees and explain why they ought to be excused from providing certain services? Can we trust that the committees will be fair in their assessments of objectors' reasons for objecting?
Those who adopt the third position outlined above against justification give negative answers to both of these questions.
We take concerns about feasibility and fairness seriously. Indeed, the state licensing boards or professional societies could be responsible for deciding how the applications will be reviewed and who will review them. 10 We deny not that this task would be complicated, but only that it is impossible.
We also believe that continuing with the status quo is not feasible. Too much conscientious objection in some parts of the world has made it impossible for health care professions or governments to meet their commitments to provide certain kinds of health care, especially abortions. 11 By restricting conscientious objections in health care to those that can be justified, we will likely cut down on the number of objections and on the shortages that objections create. 12 So why not require that objections be justified only in places where they 9
The worry that committees will not evaluate reasons for objecting fairly is a worry about bias on the committees: that they will simply promote the interests of "powerful elites," for example. 13 To calm this worry, we follow
Meyers and Woods in recommending that the committee members be diverse in terms of their race, ethnicity, religious beliefs, academic training (and, we would add, gender, class, and sexual orientation). 14 We do not presume that diversity alone, however, can answer the concern about fairness. Thus, we return to this problem and respond to it more thoroughly below.
Proving Genuineness: Meyers & Woods
In their paper, "Conscientious Objection? Yes, But Make Sure It is Genuine,"
Meyers and Woods remind readers of an argument they made in a previous paper 15 about the need for physicians who conscientiously object to abortion to justify not having to provide abortion services. The argument goes as follows.
Physicians have a duty to offer "vital and socially sanctioned" medical services, and these include abortions. 16 that the harm to the objector in abortion cases will always be greater is not obviously true (although a sympathetic reading of their work could allow them some exceptions, such as when the woman's life is at risk). Moreover, to assume that the harm to the objector only has to be greater-and so could just be marginally worse-is misleading, for it implies that the objector and patient are equally responsible for the moral conflict they are in. In reality, the objector bears more responsibility than the patient, because she, the objector, did not have to choose to be a health care professional or to choose the specialty she is in. The voluntary aspect of being a health care professional suggests that conscientious objection is not justified if patients would suffer substantial harm.
Objectors ought to have to prove not only that the harm of them violating their conscience would be great, but also that harm to patients would be minimal or would simply not occur. We develop this idea in more detail below. soul when they have blood transfusions). Thus, to focus exclusively on discriminatory refusals is problematic. We agree with this criticism, but have found it difficult to flesh out a broader category of intolerable refusals (vs.
merely discriminatory ones). We leave this task for another time not only because we believe it is complicated, but also because we want to highlight the problem of leaving room for discriminatory refusals.
At this point, we hope to have said enough to convince the reader that justification for conscience exemptions in health care must involve more than proving genuineness. Health care professionals' voluntary role as professionals and their duty not to discriminate against patients, among other duties, makes the justification for these exemptions more complicated than Meyers and Woods suggest that it is.
Proving Reasonableness: Card
What about describing the necessary justification as proving the reasonableness of one's beliefs rather than their genuineness? Card makes this suggestion: the "beliefs on which conscientious objection is based must be reasonable and should be subject to evaluation in terms of their justifiability." 26 On this view, objectors must show not merely that they passionately hold the relevant beliefs, but that they hold them for good reasons. In short, they must prove that they have normative reasons for their refusal: reasons that others should accept.
Card develops his view in response to pharmacists refusing to provide women with emergency contraception (EC not as permissive as Proving Genuineness). Let us explain.
To see why Card's model is too restrictive, consider cases in which the objector cannot prove reasonableness, but the objection is genuine and grounded neither in empirical beliefs that are baseless nor in moral or religious beliefs that are discriminatory. Further, the objector can promise that she will be respectful toward patients who request the relevant service and that they will get ready access to it elsewhere. An example would be an objection to most abortions on grounds that the fetus is a person, where the objector can and will provide referrals for abortion in a morally appropriate manner. 30 We think to prohibit objections of this sort would be to fail to take conscience seriously enough. Because Card would have us prohibit them (assuming that the objectors could not prove reasonableness), we should reject Card's model. He would oppose conscience exemptions in such cases, even though the exemptions would not harm patients.
To see how Card's model could be too permissive while at the same time being too restrictive, consider that a lack of fairness in adjudicating reasonableness would probably produce some problematic exemptions and problematic denials of exemption based on conscience. Some review panels will not assess reasonableness fairly, that is, without unfairly privileging certain 30 On why it is important that referrals be respectful, see C. moral views. 31 We have this worry, in particular, about the evaluation of refusals grounded neither in empirical beliefs that are baseless nor in moral or religious beliefs that are discriminatory. Consider a belief (or set of beliefs) that arguably falls into neither of these categories: abortion is immoral because fetuses are persons. There is profound disagreement in many societies about the morality of abortion. We assume, given such disagreement, that evaluations of the reasonableness of conscientious objections to abortion will vary among review panels, with some deeming these objections reasonable and others not.
Those that favour extreme anti-abortion views, for example, will do so unjustifiably. They will issue morally problematic exemptions to the duty of health care professionals to participate in (or at least not prevent) abortions.
Notice that unfairness in adjudicating the normativity of reasons for or against abortion could also produce morally problematic denials of exemption to one's duty: that is, if the duty extends to all abortions, including, for example, sex-selective ones. A physician who refuses to perform sex-selective abortions in a society that condones or encourages sex selection (e.g. China or the US) may fail to prove the reasonableness of his position to a panel of review. We think the denial of an exemption to him would unfairly privilege this society's view about sex selection.
In general, deciding whether objectors should receive exemptions based on whether they can provide normative reasons for their refusal could create 2) that it is genuine, plus that it satisfies certain criteria. For option 2), the criteria are as follows: patients will still get the care they need in a respectful and timely fashion, any empirical beliefs on which the objection rests are not baseless, and the moral or religious beliefs on which it rests are not discriminatory.
To get clear on our position, consider how it would apply to the case of 32 We accept that this potential exists in evaluating not just the reasonableness but also the genuineness of objections. However, we believe that the problem is more serious with the former. Simply put, determining whether people's views are justifiable is generally less straightforward than determining whether they are genuinely committed to those views. To decide the latter, we can often just look to their behaviour to see whether it is consistent with the relevant commitments.
a pharmacist who refuses to dispense EC. The pharmacist would first choose whether he wants to attempt to prove reasonableness (as understood above reasonableness; however, they should not have to do so. We hope that the need for and merit of our view is clear.
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Imperfections and Conclusion
No model for the justification of conscience exemptions in health care will be perfect. Nonetheless, we feel that we can minimize the imperfections in our own view by taking certain criticisms of it seriously, two in particular.
First, as noted above, our model will not produce fewer problematic exemptions than Card's because it still relies upon the adjudication of putatively normative reasons, which can be unreliable. As a result, objectors could succeed in proving reasonableness even though their objections are not reasonable. For example, the pro-life health care professional whose objection is reviewed by a panel that is predominantly pro-life will probably be excused from having to provide abortion services on the grounds that abortions are immoral, which is (arguably) false, at least about most abortions.
To respond to this first criticism, we would like to propose that an appeals process be set up so that poor decisions of review boards could be
overturned. An appeal should be open not only to objectors, but also to their colleagues, to their prospective patients, or really to any interested party. For example, Planned Parenthood could appeal when an objector succeeds in proving the reasonableness of a pro-life objection to abortion. Although introducing such a measure would not eliminate bad exemptions of this sort, it could surely minimize them.
Second, we do not provide standards for judging which moral or religious beliefs are discriminatory. But review panels may differ in which 25 beliefs they deem to be discriminatory, which will generate unfairness.
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In response, giving review panels some guidance on what they should count as discriminatory would be appropriate. A handbook on discrimination that outlines the different ways in which sexism, racism, and the like can manifest themselves should be helpful for this purpose. The goal in arming review panels with such material would be to make the review process less imperfect than it would otherwise be. In particular, evaluations of the plus part of genuineness plus would be more reliable.
In summary, there will inevitably be some unfairness in deciding, in practice, what counts as a justified conscientious objection. However, by finetuning our model of justification, we believe that we have come closer to creating a fair process than our counterparts in the literature do.
To conclude, insofar as conscientious objectors in health care ought to justify their objections (in our view, they ought to do so), the justification should take the form of proving either reasonableness or genuineness plus. A 35 Ultimately they may decide differently, for example, about whether the 
